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ABSTRACT: 
This is an analytical comparative study done from a historical perspective 
between Iran and Norway as classic examples of countries touched by 
resource abundance contrastingly. The study tries to highlight the factors 
which turn oil riches into a curse so as to serve as a brief practical set of 
guidelines for countries facing the possibility of a natural resource related 
revenue increase. This study, however, does not purport to cover all the 
factors in play, but is rather of an interdisciplinary nature demonstrating the 
significance of Politics in the fate of Oil-rich countries. An abridged account 
of the petroleum sector and some other relevant information about the two 
states is initially given. The study then focuses on historical, economic, 
management and political differences which could have been influential in 
the way the two countries have been affected by their riches. A number of 
key differences are listed and elaborated on in more detail with the aid of 
examples invoked from similar countries. The study finds that factors such 
as the political structure of a country as well as its population and timing of 
oil discoveries, as factors not completely controlled by the state, carry a lot 
of weight in determining how successful a country is likely to be in 
managing its resources. 
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Table of Abbreviations 
   IRI-------------------------------------------------------Islamic Republic of Iran 
   IRIC-----------------------------------Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution 
   NIOC ----------------------------------------National Iranian Oil Company  
   NPD----------------------------------------Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
   UNSC-----------------------------------------United Nations Security Council 
 
1. Introduction 
Iran, despite holding huge oil and gas reserves, remains still  not very successful in 
its long-running struggle for development and is grappling with plentiful dire 
economic misfortunes among which a few are alarming unemployment and 
inflation rates, unequal distribution of wealth and heavy dependence on foreign 
imports. Oil, alternatively called the black gold, which has always struck Iranians 
as an infinite origin of fortune and an easy supply for what it should take the 
country to move on the path of development has in effect , from a perspective1, 
hindered the natural move of the country towards development , democracy and 
equality.  
 
                                                 
1 See For Example:  Amuzegar. J , 1981-1982, Oil Wealth: A very Mixed Blessing, 60 Foreign affairs  . 
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Whether there is a case of resource curse in Iran or not transcends the scope of this 
study. However, the case appears as very realistic and has been raised sufficiently, 
as will be discussed, by enough academics.2 The reason why one can so easily 
relate to the idea of a resource curse in Iran might be that the country in following 
this pattern is in good company. 3For the purpose of this study it is presumed that 
some of the economic complications in Iran particularly the slow pace of 
development have to do with the mismanagement of substantial oil reserves. What 
this study endeavours to touch upon is how oil reserves fail to leave this same 
impact indiscriminately all around the world; Not only have some countries not 
been adversely affected by their oil riches but have also managed to make very 
good use of their reserves. Typical examples of such countries are Botswana4, 
Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway which have been 
hugely successful in managing their resources efficiently. Some countries face 
potentially enormous revenue increases in close future due to new discoveries or 
new investments in their energy sector in the not too distant future; New 
investments in Iraqi oil reserves are estimated to increase the country’s oil 
production to over 10 million barrels per day rendering the country by far the 
biggest oil producer of the world leaving it with massive new-found revenue. 
Another example is Afghanistan which has recently been announced to have more 
than three trillion US dollars worth of natural resources.  Concern is already being 
raised in these countries over the adverse effects of such revenues and the required 
                                                 
2 Id. 
3 Some other countries which have been allegedly unsuccessful in benefiting from their natural resources 
include: Nigeria, Venezuela, Iraq. 
4 See : Iimii, A., 2007,  Escaping from the Resource Curse: Evidence from Botswana and the Rest of the 
World, 54(4) IMF Staff Papers. 
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legal and political settings for such countries to turn this opportunity into an 
economically and socially revolutionizing experience is already being discussed 
.In this study Norway, an indisputable example of a country that has escaped the 
resource curse, is used as a benchmark for success. The underlying comparison of 
the survey seeks to inspect the differences between the way oil industry has 
historically functioned in Iran and Norway as pellucid examples of a resource 
curse stricken country and one on the other end of the spectrum. To this end a 
short history of oil related sectors of each country is given. In addition to this, vital 
information regarding the economic and political infrastructures of the two 
countries is presented. Next, the differences are listed in more detail to be 
elaborated on .The stark dissimilarity between the two countries is relevant to the 
nature of this study. The comparison will be mainly concentrated on economic and 
geopolitical aspects of oil.  
 
2. Resource curse (Literature &Context): 
 Studies signify a meaningful reverse correlation between resource abundance and 
GDP growth leading to a paradox termed “resource curse”5. The paradox is that 
countries which should be better-off as a result of resource availability and big 
revenues from the export of these resources, on average, function economically 
                                                 
5  Sachs, J.D.  and Warner, A.M., 2001.  The curse of natural resources, 45 European Economics Review.  
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worse. Terry Lynn Karl in his book entitled “paradox of the plenty” 6discusses 
how oil revenues fail to bring about the much expected prosperity to the producing 
countries with a special focus on Venezuela. The question whether this strong 
correlation is reflective of a causal link or not is very difficult to address7. 
However, Ragnar Torvik  (2009) concludes based on the literature he presents 
that:  
  
‘In the last 40 years there is a negative robust correlation between the share of 
resource exports in GDP and economic growth. This correlation remains even 
when many other factors are controlled for.’ 8 
 
This robustness is indicative of a probable causal link particularly given that the 
correlation remains when all other factors are controlled for. Aslaksen (2006) also 
points to the correlation between resource riches and corruption which is merely 
one of the examples of the negative influences of resource riches on a country’s 
political economy.9 
 
                                                 
6 Terry Lynn, K, 1997.  The Paradox of Plenty : Oil Booms and Petro-states Studies in International 
Political Economy.  California: University of California Press.  
 
7  Torvik, R., 2009.  Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed while others do not?, 25(2) Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy  , 241 . 
 
8 Id 
9 Aslaksen S., Torvik, R., 2006. A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States, 108(4) 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics.  571   
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Michael L. Ross (2001) discusses the political facet of abundant oil resources; He 
argues that there exists extensive evidence that oil can hinder democracy10. 
 
A very intriguing question regarding resource riches is how it touches different 
countries in oddly varying manners. Not all the countries have been economically 
affected unfavorably after discoveries of natural resource and for every Venezuela, 
Nigeria, Iraq or Iran there exists a Norway, Canada, UK, Indonesia, Chile or 
Botswana. In some studies special attention has been given to how a resource 
curse can possibly be avoided. 
 
Ragnar Torvik (2009) does an excellent job of pinning down the differences 
between those countries which have managed to escape the curse and those which 
were affected by it. He summarizes the differences under six headings: 
 ‘(i) saving of resource income ;(ii) presidentialism versus 
parliamentarism;(iii) institutional quality;(iv) type of resources; (v) offshore versus 
onshore oil; and(vi) early versus late industrialization.’11 
 
The differences Torvik refer to appear authentic and benefit from a huge literature 
support yet vaguely abstract since they do not follow from a concrete comparison 
between two or more countries and are only supported via selective evidence from 
countries of both categories.  
                                                 
10 Ross, M., April 2001. Does oil hinder democracy, 53(3) World Politics 325. 
 
 
11 Torvik, R., 2009.  Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed while others do not?, 25(2) Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy  , 241 . 
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In this study the matter is taken to a different and more concrete level through a 
comparative historical and geo-political analysis of oil and gas sectors in two 
countries which epitomize poor and skilful resource management. Iran, having had 
an economic growth rate of-1% in the last forty years12,  has been chosen but for 
the personal acquaintance the author has with the country and that it shares many 
similarities with other countries which have proved incapable of efficient resource 
management. 
  
Stevens (2003) points out that there are very few exceptions of countries that have 
not suffered from a resource curse and Dutch disease and that the reasons are not 
yet fully understood13. However, there have been a multitude of studies that 
indicate Norway has been among the lucky few. 
 
Norway, claimed by Gylfasonis (2001)14 and demonstrated by Larsen ( 2004) 15to 
be a country which has escaped the resource curse,  has even benefited from its 
riches to catch up  with and  even forge ahead its neighbours economically and 
                                                 
12 Gylfason, T., 2001. Natural resources, education, and economic development, 45 European Economic 
Review 847. 
 
13  P Stevens, P., 2003 .  Resource impact_ Curse or blessing? A literature survey, (Online) Available from 
//www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/Vol13/article13-14.pdf ( Accessed 15 January 2010). 
 
14 Gylfason, T., 2001. Natural resources, education, and economic development, 45 European Economic 
Review 847. 
 
15 Larsen, R., 2006,  Escaping The Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway caught 
up and Forged ahead of its Neighbours., 65( 3) American Journal of Economics and Sociology  605  
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carries many important lessons for countries which face the possibility of having 
to deal with a resource curse due to new hydrocarbon discoveries. 
  
Since this study restricts its scope to a comparison between the two states, it by no 
means purports to be comprehensive. The most apparent differences striking the 
author will be listed in a separate chapter and will then be expounded and 
supported by examples invoked from other similar countries. 
 
3. Iran and a historical study of its petroleum industry: 
Iran is a big country,18th in the world, located in the middle east with a population 
of 72 million people, a population growth rate of  1.3 ( World Bank Organization 
Statistics) and a vaguely structured political hierarchy which makes judgement as 
to whether it is ,as claimed, democratic or, as alleged, entirely  autocratic very 
difficult. However, the executive is obviously stronger than the Parliament given 
the almost limitless authorities of the supreme leader.16 The country has a GDP of 
385 billion dollars17 and produces 4.174 million barrels18 of oil a day making it the 
fourth biggest oil producer and the third biggest oil exporter in the world; The 
country holds the second largest oil and gas reserves in the World. The 
                                                 
16 Article 110 of The Iranian Constitution lays out the responsibilities of the supreme leader( An unelected 
head of the three forces also having extensive executive authorities). 
17 The world Fact book( CIA) , Iran (Online) Available from:  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ir.html( Accessed  05 January 2010). 
 
18 Id 
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unemployment rate is 12.5 percent and 18 percent of people live under poverty 
line. The Gini index of the country is 44.519. 
 
Oil was discovered in Iran in 1907, when the country had a predominantly rural 
texture with very little population growth due to the high rate of infant mortalities 
and epidemics. In this setting when Iran did not have a strong central government 
and was divided between tribe heads was that William Darcy succeeded in 
discovering oil reserves for the first time in the middle-east.  
 
As to the Darcy concession, in 1909 the Anglo-Persian company came into being 
with the British government acquiring 51 percent of its shares in 1914, unveiling 
the unimaginable significance of Iranian oil for the British government. On the 
Iranian side, however, the little royalty paid which was very insignificant in 
proportion to what was made kept Iranian kings, who were blissfully unaware of 
the great significance of the commodity, to a point contented. 
 
The economy of the country was for the most part reliant on agriculture and 
handcrafts.  Iran has always been a strategically important country and one in 
which very cheap oil can be produced without much risk. This has always meant a 
golden opportunity for IOCs to gain enormous revenues. Oil was discovered in 
Iran at an age when it had yet to become nearly as important as it is today and the 
country had little, if any, domestic consumption. All this together made Iran a 
                                                 
19 Id 
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unique prey for oil companies. The significance of oil began to increase sharply 
and so did the expectations of the Iranian government leading to conflicts of 
interest; Darcy concession could not survive for its full term and was replaced 
with another concession in 1933. The history of oil in Iran is fraught with politics. 
This is because oil was becoming a vital commodity for any industrial country as 
an input to the economy and an indispensable commodity for rapidly developing 
western countries. In the middle of the twentieth century, the predominantly rural 
population was living in poverty20 grappling with severe conditions when huge 
money was being made by the Anglo- Iranian oil company. 1951 marks the 
nationalization of Iranian oil, much earlier than the wave of nationalizations 
started in the world in the 1970s. 
Graph 1 
 
 
                                                 
20  ‘Infant mortality rate was a shocking 500 per 1000, food consumption throughout the nation was the 
lowest in the Middle-East, tropical diseases were rampant and about 90 percent of people were 
illiterate.’  
 J. Walden J., 1962.  The International Cartel in Iran: Private Power and the Public Interest, 11 Journal 
of Public Law. 
 
Source: “The story of Oil” at http://www.tebyan.net/index.aspx?pid=10893 
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 In 1950, the revenue the British government collected merely through tax from 
the Anglo-Iranian company was far more than the Iranian government was given 
in total21. This Obscene disparity brought about a nationalistic movement which 
culminated in the oil nationalization Act of 1951.However, politics had its part to 
play in preventing Iranian cheap oil from escaping from the control of the West 
and an allegedly British-US backed military coup22 came to the aid of the British, 
and suddenly a number of major American oil companies, to continue enjoying 
cheap Persian oil. It was only after the 1973 oil shock that the country started 
earning substantial revenues from oil which could give momentum to its 
industrialization. As a result of the oil price increase the country experienced 
momentarily prosperous days and the acceleration of its development programs. 
However, the Iranian government’s dependence on oil grew as crude oil consisted 
of a large proportion of the Iranian GDP and an extensive process of urbanization 
kicked off as a result of oil industry expansion wreaking havoc on the country’s 
agricultural sector. Besides, the imports to the country were tripled, the 
government budget increased and vast sums of money were wasted on Ceremonial 
celebrations of the Monarchy. The political structure, the Monarchy, bureaucracy 
and most importantly blatant corruption hindered equal distributions of oil revenue 
sparking dissatisfaction among people. However, despite all this, the country with 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 See Id and  Elm, M., 1992,  Oil, Power and Principle: Iran’s Oil Nationalization and its Aftermath. New 
York: Syracuse University Press. 
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a vast land and only a population of 30 million people could have realized its 
dream of being among the developed countries if it was not for politics.  
Iran spent very huge amounts of money on arms which literally gave the west back 
most of the money it had lost on the purchase of crude oil; Iran spent some 10 
billion US dollars on ammunitions between the years 1972 and 197423. However, 
even worse was to follow.  The Iranian oil industry workers went on a nationwide 
strike in 1978 in continuation of the anti government protests which decreased the 
oil production to very insignificant amounts. The Iranian revolution tore down all 
development programs and the new found Islamic regime inevitably took over the 
reliance on oil revenues. The 1979 revolution moved the country towards state 
nationalization of most industrial and non industrial sectors. It was after the 1979 
revolution that the population started growing in an unprecedented rate reaching a 
record high climax growth rate of 3.94 percent in 1985(See graph 4).The country 
underwent an eight year exhaustive war costing it a very huge amount of money 
with its Iraqi neighbor which harmed the economy in many ways; the oil 
production did not live up to its previous standards and a large amount of money 
was inexorably spent on arms and weaponry for the war. Needless to mention, 
after the Islamic revolution, Iran lost most of its western partners due to its 
allegedly harsh policies towards the west. Since 1997 new US sanctions24 
prevented foreign investors from providing the country with its much needed 
investment in the oil industry as well as other industrial sectors. The Nuclear crisis 
                                                 
23 Tabatabayi, M., 2007,  Iranian Petroleum contracts from 1953 Coup until The Islamic revolution(in (in 
Farsi),( Online) at:  http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8512230092( accessed  10 February 
2010). 
 
24 IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 (House of Representatives - June 18, 1996) 
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started in 2001 and continues to the date having brought about numerous UNSC 
sanctions further tightening the grip. As to gas production, the country suffers 
from a severe lack of sufficient funding now critically worsened after the new 
round of sanctions in 2010. In spite of holding the second largest gas reserves in 
the world, the country produces only about as much as its own domestic 
consumption25. Politics has also worked against Iran in preventing Iran from 
striking some important gas sales contracts recently26. Legally speaking, buyback 
contracts have failed to attract the much needed investment leading to discussions 
as to an alternative27. 
The vaguely bureaucratic fiscal regime of the oil industry has continued thirty 
years down the line. Huge and wasteful domestic energy consumptions 
encouraged by government subsidies take a big lump out of the potential oil 
revenues. Inefficiency is rampant in all Iranian state industries which dominate the 
economy only allowing private sector to participate in small-scale workshops, 
farming, and services28.  Subsidies are a heavy burden for the government and 
expenditures on arms continue. Refinement capacity has not expanded enough 
even to make the country independent of gasoline imports29. The parliament has 
little supervision over the National Iranian Oil Company and tax evasion plus 
lenient tax policies mean the country has little dependence on tax collected from 
                                                 
25 IEA Energy Reports (2006). 
26  For example see: Verma, S., 2007,   Energy Geopolitics and Iran- Pakistan-India gas Pipeline, 35 Energy 
Policy. 
 
27 Shiravi, A., Ebrahimi, N., 2006. Exploration and development of Iran’s oilfields through buyback, 30 
Natural Resource Forum . 
 
28 Islamic Republic Of Iran, Constitution 1979 , Article 44. 
29  The Iranian government only spent seven Billion Dollars on Gasoline imports in the year 2009. see:  
http://www.iranpressnews.com/source/069897.htm. 
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people. In recent years Enormous oil revenue increases have failed to produce any 
tangible differences in people’s living standards. The country does not enjoy a 
high standard of living and the political instability and the deep political divide  
following the 2009 presidential election has recently been added to all the above 
problems. 
 
 
4. Norway:  
Norway is a moderately big country in the context of Europe, the 67th  in the 
world. Its economy is a blend of capitalism with government intervention in areas 
of key importance such as the petroleum sector. It is the third largest gas exporter 
and seventh largest oil exporter as of 200930. The petroleum sector accounts for 
nearly half of exports and over 30% of state revenue31. The unemployment rate is 
2.6% . The country has a population of 4,756,00 and enjoys a GDP of 450 billion 
US dollars32.  
 
The political system of Norway is a constitutional parliamentary Monarchy33.   
Norway has a very small army of only 27000 soldiers implying a small Budget 
and little expenditure on arms. Besides, very low domestic oil and gas 
consumption, accounting for as little as five percent of oil and seven percent of gas 
                                                 
30 The World Fact book (CIA), Norway(Online) Available from: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/no.html ( Accessed  20 January 2010). 
 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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consumption, allows the country to export most of its production. Norway had for 
decades lagged behind its Scandinavian neighbors in terms of Gross domestic 
Product before the discovery of oil in 1960s34 but could with the help of 
‘deliberate macroeconomic policy, the arrangement of political and economic 
institutions, a strong judicial system, and social norms’35, which turned its oil 
resources into a blessing rather than a curse, surpass its neighbours and become 
the richest Scandinavian country at the turn of the millennium36. 
 
Graph 237 
 
 
                                                 
34 Larsen, R., 2006,  Escaping The Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway caught 
up and Forged ahead of its Neighbours., 65( 3) American Journal of Economics and Sociology  605-  
 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Graph from Larsen, Id. 
 16
Oil capable of exploitation was found in Norway on December 23rd in 1969 by 
Philips when the country was well-equipped to deal with its oil wealth having 
passed the necessary laws and having proclaimed its sovereignty over its 
continental shelf and its natural resources, in 196338. Extraction of oil started in 
1971. The country was already industrialized and developed and, therefore, 
finding oil and gas in abundance put it in a unique position in the world. Initially, 
the Petroleum Industry was dominated by foreign investors but the government 
established Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap (Norway state oil company)39 in 1972 
via an act passed in the Norway parliament with the aim of having participation in 
the petroleum sector. The company had to provide the Norway parliament with 
annual reports. Participation in Petroleum industry required Licenses issued by 
NPD (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate) which functions as a regulator40. There 
has been stability in the legal atmosphere of Norway with very little changes in 
laws or contractual regimes since 1970s. 
 
Norway could escape Dutch disease partly as a result of the parliament taking 
conscious steps in 1970s to avoid it by implementing seven deliberate explicit 
policy schemes.41 
                                                 
38 Bendixen, F.B., Andresens Bank A. S., 1979. Norway, the development and Significance of its Oil 
industry with emphasis on current trends in Politics and Economy, SPE Hydrocarbon Economics and 
Evaluation Symposium, USA, Texas, (7736-MS) 6200 N. Central Expwy., Dallas, Texas 75206.  
 
39  “STATOIL”. 
40 Author’s translation of , A study of the structure and Laws of oil and gas resource management in 
Norway, (Online) Available from:   
http://www.mop.ir/pshr/Departments/HidroCarburiDepartment/Menu2/TahghighVaPajoohesh/Modiriat%2
0Manabe%20Naft%20va%20Gaz%20Norvej.pdf ( Accessed 21 January 2010). 
 
41 See Larsen, R., 2006,  Escaping The Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway 
caught up and Forged ahead of its Neighbours., 65( 3) American Journal of Economics and Sociology  605  
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As part of these policies, The Petroleum Fund of Norway was established in 1990s 
so that surplus wealth produced by oil revenues could be deposited in it. It later 
changed name to The Government Pension Fund. The fund was established 
because of the possiblity of running out of oil in the future. Besides, the fund 
protected the economy from excessive demand and ensured higher wages. ‘Since 
1996, every krone the government has earned from oil has gone into a savings 
fund, which now totals some £240bn -- more than a year’s gross domestic product 
and equivalent to about £50,000 for each of Norway’s 4.8 million citizens’42. 
 
Until the year 2002, approximately 40 percent of all Norway Oil resources and 
about 10 percent of all its Gas resources were depleted. This risked deriving 
petroleum revenues to zero in about forty years.43  In response to this eminent 
threat OG21 set reduction of costs and increase of competition through 
improvements in technology as a main goal for all active companies in the 
Petroleum industry given the significance of the sector for the economy of the 
country and its employment44. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
. 
42 Sandbu, M., An Iraqi who saved Norway from its oil, Financial times (London) August 29, 2009. 
 
43 Author’s Translation of, Developing structure of technology( Norway Model) (Online) Available from: 
http://www.itan.ir/?Mode=Print&id=1658 (Accessed 16 January 2010). 
 
 
44 Id. 
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Larsen shows how strong politico-economic institutions as well as a strong legal 
system, social contract and social norms could minimize rent seeking in Norway45.  
5. The main differences 
In this chapter, the main differences between the two countries will be studied 
closely inspecting how these disparities might have affected the influence of 
natural resources on their economy. They are listed in six main categories.  
 
A. Population and population growth rate: 
B. Political structure and transparency 
C. Timing of oil discoveries 
D. Savings of oil income 
E. Political stability and wars: 
5-1.Population:  
     
Graph 3 
                                                 
45 Larsen, R., 2006,  Escaping The Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway caught 
up and Forged ahead of its Neighbours., 65( 3) American Journal of Economics and Sociology.  
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An important determinant of the wealth of a country and standards of living is 
its GDP per capita. Petroleum industry revenues remain the same, except for 
domestic consumption, despite differences in population or size of the country. Oil 
production capacity depends almost completely on the size and conditions of the 
reserves, technology of exploitation and capital. A key distinction between Iran 
and Norway is the huge difference between the population of the two countries the 
former being nearly 72 million, the latter being 4 million and seven hundred 
thousand. If the population growth of the two countries is studied in the course of 
the last forty years, since when Norway had commercial discoveries of oil and gas, 
results will be striking. The Population of Iran has increased by 260 percent while 
in the case of Norway it has only been 12 percent. Iran has had a population 
increase of more than 43 million people since 1969. This growth rate resembles 
those of a number of other countries which have not experienced a sufficient 
economic growth despite resource abundance, as well.  
 20
 
Obviously, population is an important factor when resource management is 
concerned. First and foremost, a bigger population equals a bigger domestic 
consumption lowering the exporting capacity of the country. Second, a big 
population requires a big government budget which inevitably has to be spent on 
the daily management of the country leaving less for investment and saving. 
 
Graph 4 
 
The graph shows the population growth rates of Iran, Venezuela and Nigeria as 
examples of countries which have suffered from the curse comparing them with 
those of United Kingdom and Norway as commonly cited examples of countries 
which have avoided the curse. 
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5-2. Political structure: 
  The political structures of the two countries are vastly different. Michael L. Ross 
In his study indicates how oil riches can deter democracy provided that oil 
discoveries happen before the establishment of a democratic regime46, obviously 
the case in Iran, and how oil revenues can assist autocratic countries to hinder 
democracy. A close look at the political structure of most oil rich Arab Gulf states 
bears testimony to this claim. However, whether the long standing autocracy in 
Iran is a reason or a result of oil matters little. Andersen and Aslaksen (2008), 
however, find that being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth 
effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic47. In this sense, the 
executive, the supreme leader and the president, in the Iranian Political structure 
evidently outweighs the legislative making it a theocratic presidential semi 
democracy whereas Norway is a constitutional Monarchy with a very strong 
supervising Parliament. 
 
The political structure is an important factor especially when rent seeking is 
concerned. State corruption is usually a function of a non-democratic political 
structure. This is verified by the Global Corruption report of transparency 
international (2008) which happens to place non-democratic countries such as 
Zimbabwe (170), Sudan (175), Turkmenistan (168), among the very worst.48 
                                                 
46 Ross, M., April 2001. Does oil hinder democracy, 53(3) World Politics . 
 
47 Aslaksen S., Torvik, R., 2006. A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States, 108(4) 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics.   
 
48The Global Corruption Report 2009, Table 13: Corruption Perceptions Index 2008 (online) available 
from:  
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Intriguingly most oil rich countries also rank poorly in the index. Examples are 
Venezuela (165), Iran (142) , Iraq(178).  
 
The existence of a correlation between oil and corruption is not very difficult to 
claim, but establishing a causal link between the too requires more studies with a 
higher degree of precision.  
 
A number of studies such as (Gylfason 2001) 49, (Sachs and Warner 2001)50 and 
(Torvik 2002)51 consider corruption and rent seeking as instrumental elements 
contributing to a resource curse. 
 
As a result of strong parliamentary supervision in Norway, there is a great degree 
of transparency as far as oil and gas revenues are concerned. The parliament does 
not enjoy the same supervisory authority in Iran causing confusion and obscurity. 
There even exist disparities between the amount of oil exports between 
government declarations and international claims. Huge amounts of money can go 
missing from the treasury as has been the case recently in Iran. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.transparency.lt/new/images/global_corruption_report_2009_170909_2_web%5B1%5Da.pdf     
( Accessed 30 January 2010).    
 
49 Gylfason, T., 2001. Natural resources, education, and economic development, 45 European Economic 
Review. 
 
50 Sachs, J.D., Warner, A.M,  1995, Natural Resources, Rent Seeking and Welfare, 67 Journal of 
Development Economics. 
 
51 Torvik, R., 2002,  Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth ,NBER Working Paper No. 5398 . 
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Graph 5 
 
 
 
 
5-3. Timing of oil discoveries: 
As one of the most apparent differences between Iran and Norway, it can be 
claimed that the timing of oil discoveries can be of influence in many ways. 
Norway had petroleum discoveries as late as the late 1960s when the country was 
already an industrialized country among the richest in its region if not the world. 
The country had the legal and technological infrastructure as well as sufficient 
capital to take advantage of its oil riches. Discoveries happened when Norway did 
not require much assistance from other countries while in the case of Iran as 
discussed earlier in chapter two, the petroleum sector was controlled by foreigners 
for more than forty years resulting in massive loss of national interest. Norway had 
its first legislations in the year 1963, 6 years before commercial discoveries, while 
Iran made its first legislation regarding oil in 1951. The Norwegian State oil 
This graph comes from Friedman’s First law of Petropolitics. In his article, he claims 
there is a reverse correlation between oil prices and the degree of economic and political 
freedom in oil-producing countries. He focuses especially on Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria and 
Russia.  
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company was founded in 1972 establishing a strong foothold for the state, whereas 
the NIOC( National Iranian oil company) was established only in 1950s, more 
than forty years after oil discoveries in Iran. In fact, the level of preparedness and 
the standing of the country in the world have much to do with the efficiency of 
resource management. Countries that are having natural resource discoveries or 
revenue increases these years can obviously enjoy a much higher level of 
readiness to deal with [potential problems.  
 
5-4. Political & legal stability: 
The last forty years of Iran have been laden with crisis. The country has 
experienced a big revolution tearing down all its economic institutions and an 
eight year war with its neighbouring Iraq. The country, having been continuously 
threatened by United States and Israel, has had to have huge arms expenditures. A 
capital intensive nuclear program has also consumed huge capital from 
government’s revenue. Political instability has been going downhill especially 
after the 2009 presidential election, with the occurrence of the worst protests and 
riots in the last thirty years. Instabilities, which may have been partly caused by 
the strategic geo-political position of the country, have distracted the government 
from its main role of providing its people with welfare. To the contrary, Norway 
has enjoyed very high political stability with no wars or foreign threats in the last 
forty years.  It has been discussed that countries with oil are more likely to plunge 
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into violence and civil wars52. Regardless of the veracity of this claim, wars and 
domestic instability can obviously distort the economic performance of states. To 
this one should add legal stability; Iran has had regular changes in its laws relating 
to Oil and Gas industry53. This as well as political stability is significant in 
determining foreign investment levels; thus, there is no surprise that Norway has 
been very successful in attracting investment.  Experience of some other countries 
grappling with a resource curse bears witness to this claim. A particularly more 
severe case is Iraq. Nigeria and Venezuela have also had their fair share of 
political instability.   
 
5-5. Savings of oil income:  
Torvik(2009) makes a comparison between  the  resource-adjusted saving rates54 
of countries which have escaped the resource curse and those which have not and 
demonstrates that there is a correlation between resource-adjusted saving rates and 
how successful countries are in escaping the resource curse acknowledging that a 
causal link can not be established definitively. 
 
As far as saving oil revenues are concerned, Unlike Iran, Norway has had huge 
savings of its oil revenues and has a huge resource-adjusted saving rate, among the 
                                                 
52 Ross, M., April 2001. Does oil hinder democracy, 53(3) World Politics 325. 
. 
53 There have been many changes in the contractual frameworks within which the Iranian government has 
so far co-operated with IOCs. There have been many changes in legislations as well .  
54 . Resource-adjusted saving rates do not count oil revenue as income since extracting 
depletable resources is simply a transformation of assets rather than income. Resource-adjusted 
savings rate is usually presented as percentage of gross national income. 
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bests in the world55 , as well. To the contrary, Iran spends almost all its oil revenue 
on day to day running of the country which makes the country face serious Budget 
deficits whenever the oil revenue is less than anticipated due to price fluctuations. 
Therefore, an important distinction between Iran and Norway could be the way 
revenues produced from resources is used. Countries like Iran, Nigeria and 
Venezuela have become increasingly dependent on their oil revenues and can not 
survive without them, whereas countries like Norway have the luxury of using 
their natural resource induced revenue on welfare, building hospitals and roads 
through saving the money in special Funds. 
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendations: 
A comparison between Iran and Norway will reveal a number of differences, 
particularly influential in the way the two countries have been affected by their 
resources, most of which are not within the control of the government, yet they 
can be taken into consideration when drafting an energy policy and consequently 
their effects could be lessened. It is important to note that any country particularly 
one heavily reliant on revenues from depletable resources would be much better-
off with a small population growth rate. Therefore, sound social and cultural 
policies should be adopted so as to prevent the population from growing 
uncontrollably. Additionally, Countries with potential huge new-found natural 
resource revenues like Iraq and Afghanistan should begin anticipating the potential 
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complications such money could cause and they should consider solutions long 
before these revenues are realized. Besides, this study shows how geo-political 
and demographic standings of countries can be of key significance in determining 
whether they can manage to escape the resource curse or not. However, it can not 
be denied that any country like Norway can deliberately attempt to address the 
issue through adopting sound economic polices. Norway is very good example to 
follow as far as management of income from natural resources is concerned. 
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